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Abstract
Presidential approval tends to exhibit the dynamics of honey-
moon, decline, and a rebound as elections near. But several pres-
idential administrations and, indeed, some countries themselves, 
do not conform to this pattern. This introduction to the special is-
sue identifies and classifies outliers to the typical dynamics of ap-
proval using a 12-category taxonomy and data on 140 presidential 
administrations in 18 Latin American countries from the Executive 
Approval Project 1.0. Contributors to this special issue use this tax-
onomy to select outlier cases to explain in their respective articles. 
This combination of cross-national and case-study approaches 
suggest a more general theory of presidential approval can be con-
structed by systematically testing new hypotheses generated in 
this special issue concerning the role of governing style, political 
communication, security, policy choice, and institutional context.
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Resumen
La aprobación presidencial tiende a exhibir una dinámica de lu-
na de miel, declive y repunte cuando se acercan las elecciones. 
Pero varias administraciones presidenciales y, de hecho, algunos 
países, no responden a este patrón. Esta introducción al núme-
ro especial identifica y clasifica los puntos fuera de la curva (out-
liers) de las dinámicas típicas de la aprobación con el uso de una 
taxonomía de 12 categorías y datos de 140 administraciones pre-
sidenciales en 18 países latinoamericanos de la Executive Appro-
val Database 1.0. Los colaboradores de este número especial utili-
zan esta taxonomía para seleccionar los casos outlier que explican 
en sus respectivos artículos. Esta combinación de un acercamien-
to transnacional junto a estudios de casos sugiere que se puede 
construir una teoría de la aprobación presidencial más general 
testeando sistemáticamente las nuevas hipótesis generadas a lo 
largo de este número especial con respecto a los papeles del esti-
lo de gobernar, la comunicación política, la seguridad, la selección 
de la política pública y el contexto institucional.
Pollsters and scholars throughout the Americas have studied 
presidential approval for decades. Only recently, however, 
has a “typical” approval dynamic –a honeymoon that de-
cays after a few quarters, before recovering as a new elec-
tion approaches– been identified in both the United States 
and in Latin America (Carlin et al., 2018). Such a pattern 
hints at a degree of determinism by which presidents are 
destined to lose support over the course of their adminis-
trations and only partially recover it towards the end. Re-
flecting on this somewhat fatalistic pattern in his seminal 
analysis of presidential approval dynamics in the Unit-
ed States, John E. Mueller (1973) suggested that the only 
way presidents can stay popular throughout their terms is 
to “be Dwight Eisenhower” (233). Observers of Latin Ameri-
ca could, likewise, advise leaders to be Álvaro Uribe, Néstor 
Kirchner, or Danilo Medina –all of whom maintained high 
approval throughout their terms, seemingly against all odds.
As unassailable as such advice might be, it gets us very 
little conceptual or theoretical purchase. Conceptually, sus-
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tained and high popularity is not the only way popularity 
can deviate from the typical cyclical dynamic. As it turns 
out, although approval dynamics in Latin America look very 
similar on average to the pattern Mueller and others found 
for the U.S., recent research reveals a number of presiden-
cies that buck this trend in a variety of ways (Carlin, Love, 
and Martínez-Gallardo 2015a; Carlin et al., 2018). In this 
special issue we describe and examine a handful of these 
outlier cases. The studies presented here contribute to our 
theoretical understanding of the dynamics of approval in 
presidential regimes by exploring variation across a range 
of different political, institutional, and economic contexts, 
and by highlighting factors that explain how and when 
presidents deviate from the typical cycle.
The importance of presidential popularity can hardly be 
overstated. In the U.S. case, Neustadt (1960) was the first 
to argue that a president’s prestige decisively shapes his 
or her power to govern. Mueller (1971) likened public dis-
approval of a president to “a non-constructive vote of no-
confidence” (18). As Stimson put it, “If the real power of the 
presidency is not directly proportional to the most recent 
Gallup popularity rating, it is not far from it” (1976, 2). Re-
search on Latin America reaches conclusions that are even 
more imperative. When they are broadly supported by the 
public, the region’s presidents are not only more successful 
in legislative battles (Calvo, 2007) and in inter-branch bar-
gaining (Martínez-Gallardo, 2012), they are also more like-
ly to rule by decree (Shair-Rosenfield and Stoyan, 2018), to 
finish out their mandates (Pérez-Liñán, 2007), and to al-
ter constitutional rules to permit reelection (Corrales, 2018).
There is a great deal of evidence that presidential popular-
ity and governance are linked. 
This introduction has three main goals. First, we de-
scribe the typical pattern of approval dynamics and de-
pict it graphically, aggregated by region, country, and ad-
ministration. Second, we propose a typology of outliers to 
this trend and identify some cases from Latin America that 
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fit each category. Our typology identifies three stages in a 
president’s term (honeymoon, post-honeymoon pattern, 
and rebound) and explores ways in which presidents’ ap-
proval can vary in each stage. Third and finally, we pre-
view the studies that comprise this special issue and high-
light some general implications of the research.
Cyclical presidential approval dynamics  
in Latin America
Until recently, limitations on cross-nationally comparative 
measures of presidential approval had precluded anything 
but a piecemeal understanding of the dynamics of presi-
dential approval in Latin America. The introduction of the 
Executive Approval Database (EAD) 1.0 (Carlin, Hartlyn, 
Hellwig, Love, Martínez-Gallardo and Singer, 2016), how-
ever, has helped overcome most of these limitations. 
The EAD 1.0 uses Stimson’s (1991, 2018) dyads-ratio al-
gorithm to combine 11,246 survey marginals from 324 
separate time-series indicators of presidential support in-
to single-country time series that are comparable, within 
countries, across administrations, and over time. The EAD 
covers 140 presidential administrations in 18 Latin Amer-
ican countries from the late 1970s to the second quarter 
of 2016.4 A recent study by Carlin, Hartlyn, Hellwig, Love, 
Martínez-Gallardo and Singer (2018) uses EAD 1.0 to ana-
lyze approval dynamics in Latin America and finds striking 
similarities between presidential approval in the region and 
in the world’s longest-standing presidential democracy, 
the United States (Brace and Hinckley, 1992; Gronke and 
Newman, 2003; Mueller, 1970; Stimson, 1976). Like their 
counterparts in the United States, Latin American presi-
dents exhibit strong cyclical dynamics: approval rises after 
the presidential election, remains elevated during a honey-
4 Quarterly and monthly versions of the EAD 1.0 and tools for visualization and 
aggregation using the dyads-ratio algorithm are available at www.executi-
veapproval.org. 
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moon period of less than one year, then inevitably falls un-
til it recovers as new elections approach.
Figure 1. 
Dynamics of presidential approval in 18 Latin American  
countries and in the United States, 95% C.I.s 
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Source: Carlin et al., 2018, 4, Figure 2; The Executive Approval  
Database 1.0 (Carlin et al., 2016).
These cyclical dynamics can be observed in Figure 1 (repro-
duced from Carlin et al., 2018, 4; Figure 2) which juxtapos-
es on-average approval ratings for all U.S. presidents from 
Harry S. Truman to Donald J. Trump5 and approval ratings 
for all Latin American presidents in the EAD 1.0 (Table A1 
describes the data included in Figure 1). Figure 1 was cre-
ated using kernel-weighted local polynomial regression on 
smoothed measures of presidential approval for each ad-
ministration. Whereas the left-hand panel simply combines 
approval series, the right-hand panel reports approval se-
5 We acknowledge James Stimson’s generosity in providing these data. 
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ries mean-centered by administration to account for varia-
tion in average levels of support. Both panels suggest a cy-
clical pattern in presidential approval in the United States 
and, somewhat more dramatically, in Latin America. High 
initial approval generates a honeymoon that persists well 
into the first year in office –on average, two quarters for 
U.S. presidents and three quarters for their Latin Ameri-
can counterparts. As the honeymoon evaporates, approv-
al drops gradually, before bouncing back as new elections 
draw nigh. This is the typical cyclical pattern of presiden-
tial approval dynamics to which we refer going forward.
Figure 2.  
Dynamics of presidential approval in Latin America  
by country, 95% C.I.s
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Source: Carlin et al., 2018, 5, Figure 3; Executive Approval  
Database 1.0 (Carlin et al., 2016).
Aggregated in this way, the data clearly show that, on av-
erage, presidential countries have similar approval dynam-
ics, despite significant differences in the political, social, 
and economic context. This high-level aggregation, how-
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ever, masks a great deal of theoretically-relevant heteroge-
neity. To explore this variation, in Figure 2 we decompose 
mean-centered approval dynamics by country (reproduced 
from Carlin et al., 2018, 5; Figure 3). Although, at first blush, 
cyclical approval dynamics seems to be at work in most 
countries, a closer look reveals some striking differences. In 
Bolivia and Mexico, for example, popularity varies very lit-
tle over time. In other countries, like Paraguay or the Do-
minican Republic, instead of a significantly higher level of 
approval at the start of the term –a honeymoon–, popular-
ity peaks near the middle of the term. Finally, end-of-term 
rebounds do not appear to be a systematic component of 
presidential approval dynamics in Brazil, Colombia, or Gua-
temala.
Of course, looking at average approval over time by 
country makes it hard to know whether these patterns apply 
to most incumbents in the country, or if they are the result 
of outlier presidents who distort the dynamics we observe. 
In the next section, we disaggregate the data even more to 
look at variations in patterns of approval within countries, 
across presidential terms. Outlier patterns suggest outlier 
politics. But before we can theorize about such data-gener-
ating processes it is crucial to recognize them.
Outliers to the cyclical pattern of presidential  
approval in Latin America
In order to identify outliers to the “typical” cycle of presiden-
tial approval, we start by dividing the cycle into three dis-
tinct phases: (1) the honeymoon, (2) the pattern of post-hon-
eymoon variation, and (3) the end-of-term bounce. Outliers 
can deviate on one or more of these dimensions. Regarding 
honeymoons, for example, we can observe whether presi-
dents enjoy the expected higher-than-average approval in 
the first three quarters, or not. After the theoretical honey-
moon period, we can observe whether approval decays as 
expected, remains more or less static, or grows. Finally, we 
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can observe whether popularity rebounds at the end of the 
presidential term, in line with the cyclical pattern, or not. 
[See Figure 3]. 
Table 1 captures the theoretical range of presidential ap-
proval dynamics on each of these dimensions. Entries in 
the table represent observations from Figure 3, which 
moves down a final order of aggregation to the level of an 
administration (reproduced from Carlin et al., 2018, 3; Fig-
ure 1). The cell in the upper-left corner represents the ex-
pected pattern of approval dynamics: Honeymoon/YES, 
Post-Honeymoon Pattern/Decay, and Rebound/YES. Each of 
the other cells represents a deviation, in kind not in degree, 
from this pattern. The cells include examples of presidents 
whose approval ratings represent each form of deviation. 
Table 1. Types of outliers of presidential  
approval dynamics
Honeymoon Post-Honeymoon Pattern
YES Decay Static Growth
Rebound [Expected Type]
YES
Bachelet (Chile)
Piñera (Chile)
Santos I (Colombia)
Saca (El Salvador)
García I (Peru)
Batlle (Uruguay)
Fox (Mexico)
Cardoso I (Brazil)
Lagos (Chile)
Lula II (Brazil)
Colom (Guatemala)
Zedillo (Mexico)
Correa II (Ecuador)
Flores (El Salvador)
NO Maduro (Honduras)Figueres (Costa Rica)
Menem I (Argentina) 
Kirchner (Argentina)
Uribe I (Colombia)
Calderón (Mexico)
Salinas (Mexico)
Torrijos (Panama)
Uribe II (Colombia)
Honeymoon Post-Honeymoon Pattern
NO Decay Static Growth
Rebound
YES Reina (Honduras)
Lacalle (Uruguay)
Rodríguez (Costa Rica)
Menem II (Argentina)
Sanguinetti II  
(Uruguay)
NO Pastrana (Colombia)Portillo (Guatemala) Alemán (Nicaragua)
Cardoso II (Brazil)
Arias II (Costa Rica)
Arzú (Guatemala)
Flores (Honduras)
Fujimori I (Peru)
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Though many administrations fit the cyclical pattern quite 
closely, many others deviate sharply from it. Indeed, all of 
the conceptual cells have at least one example and the lists 
are not exhaustive. First, presidents in the top half of Table 
1 enjoyed a honeymoon, while those in the bottom half did 
not. Overall, around a third of the outlier presidencies in 
Table 1 lack a honeymoon (examples include Reina in Hon-
duras and Pastrana in Colombia). The presence of many se-
cond-term presidents in this category (Cardoso and Arias, 
for example) matches findings from the U.S. that suggest 
second-term presidents enjoy shortened honeymoons (Bra-
ce and Hinckley, 1992). But the frequency with which these 
presidents experience post-honeymoon growth is at odds 
with the conventional wisdom that presidents are doomed 
to fall to lower depths of approval in their second terms. 
Second, a common deviation is away from the expect-
ed linear decline between the honeymoon and end-of-term 
rebound; some presidents’ approval ratings remain static 
(like Menem and Kirchner in Argentina) or even grow in this 
period (like Salinas and Zedillo in Mexico). Finally, in the 
third phase –the expected rebound as elections approach– 
there is no guarantee that a president’s popularity will 
recover at the end of the term, regardless of what is has do-
ne to that point. Future research can fruitfully exploit these 
data to adjudicate between explanations that attribute a re-
bound in approval to election effects (such as greater media 
exposure, increasing partisanship, rising support for the po-
litical system, and open campaigning) and those that attri-
bute it to lame-duck presidents who have few incentives to 
push their agenda and battle their opponents.
It is worth noting that the same political system can gen-
erate different types of outliers. Mexico, for example, tends 
to deliver presidential honeymoons of varying degrees, but 
after the initial three quarters of the term approval either 
remains static or grows –it does not decline, at least for  the 
Mexican presidents under scrutiny. Moreover, only two out 
of the four Mexican presidents in Table 1enjoy a clear end-
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of-term rebound (Zedillo and Fox). In Costa Rica, although 
the approval pattern in Figure 2 suggests a typical dynamic, 
only president Figueres enjoyed a honeymoon period, only 
Rodríguez saw his approval rebound at the end of the term, 
and all three Costa Rican presidents in Table 1exhibit dis-
tinct post-honeymoon patterns. 
The categorization of outliers in Table 1 is based on 
what we have described as the “typical” approval dynam-
ic (Carlin et al., 2018) or what Stimson (1976) calls the cy-
clical model. But specific presidents can also deviate from 
the pattern of approval that is most common in their own 
country. For example, Honduras’s Reina is the only case of 
a president with no honeymoon, a pattern of linear decay, 
and an end-of-term rebound; Nicaragua’s Alemán and Uru-
guay’s Sanguinetti are also the lone examples of their type 
–both within their countries and with respect to the over-
all pattern. The steady ascent from an already elevated lev-
el of support during Lula II appears sui generis in compari-
son with other Brazilian presidents and presidents around 
the region. Uribe’s consistently high levels of approval over 
two terms –without decay– stand out against not only the 
general dynamic, but also against conventional wisdom 
for second-term presidents. On the other hand, if we look 
within countries, Argentina’s Kirchner, Bolivia’s Morales 
I, Ecuador’s Correa I, El Salvador’s Funes, Panama’s Marti-
nelli, Peru’s García I, and Venezuela’s Chávez I each shat-
tered country-level records for high initial approval ratings 
during their respective honeymoons, while Peru’s Toledo 
shows the steepest rate of decay following elections in that 
country.
Case studies of outliers of presidential approval
Recent evidence that Latin American presidents tend to 
follow cyclical approval patterns similar to those found in 
the U.S. (Carlin et al., 2018) suggests that presidentialism 
produces similar dynamics of approval in widely varying 
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contexts –a contribution to our knowledge about presiden-
tial politics, per se. Beyond the ability to identify common 
trends, this new evidence also allows us to find and cat-
egorize outliers to the general pattern, as we have shown 
above. As is well known, outliers can be fruitfully explored 
to enhance our understanding of the phenomenon under 
scrutiny (Gerring, 2008) –in this case macro-approval dy-
namics in presidential systems. 
In that spirit, the purpose of the articles in this special 
issue is to harness the lessons learned from outlier cases 
towards a more general understanding of presidential ap-
proval than the literature on patterns of presidential ap-
proval in the U.S. can afford.The authors in this issue focus 
on outliers in Brazil (Lula), Chile (Lagos), Colombia (Uribe), 
Costa Rica (Arias), and Uruguay (Sanguinetti) to understand 
why they deviated from the cyclical pattern of presidential 
approval. Most of the empirical work in the articles is based 
on data from the Executive Approval Dataset 1.0 (Carlin et 
al., 2016) and employs a variety of methods, including time-
series analysis, cross-sectional survey analysis, and multi-
level analysis to understand the dynamics of presidential 
approval in these countries. 
There is some agreement across all the articles in this is-
sue especially regarding the influence of economic condi-
tions on approval. In every country, the ability of presidents 
to deliver on the economy is central to maintaining high 
rates of approval. However, each case study provides insight 
into other factors –political, contextual and institutional– 
that shape approval dynamics in these five countries. 
Pedro Santos Mundim’s piece on Brazil answers the puz-
zle of why Lula da Silva was much more popular, and in-
creasingly so, in his second term compared to his first. His 
argument centers on the priming effects of the mensalão 
corruption scandal that dominated headlines during Lu-
la’s second term. One on hand, the scandal made corrup-
tion the most salient issue in the public’s mind. The longer 
the scandal went on without touching Lula, the more pop-
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ular he became. On the other hand, this priming tended to 
lower citizens’ expectations about the government’s ability 
to deliver on its promises and, thus, stamped out any unre-
alistic expectations that might have outstripped even strong 
performance. Together, these two effects of the scandal al-
lowed Lula’s popularity to grow, even among the segments 
of the electorate most likely to be exposed to, and to criti-
cally evaluate, this information.
For the case of Chilean president Ricardo Lagos, José 
Miguel Cabezas and Patricio Navia offer two potential expla-
nations of his J-shaped approval curves. Partisanship mat-
tered for Lagos but that did not distinguish him from his coun-
terparts. Rather, market-friendly reforms, especially an array 
of free trade agreements, appear to have made Chileans more 
likely to connect their egotropic concerns with their evalua-
tions of Lagos than to any other Chilean president before or 
since. If this is correct, it would explain the steady increase in 
his approval after a short downturn early on.
Miguel García-Sánchez and Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Ra-
ga analyze the case of Uribe in Colombia. The authors com-
bine aggregate and individual-level data on presidential 
approval to show that, like most presidents in the region, 
Uribe’s popularity was responsive to economic conditions 
(inflation in particular) as well as socio- and ego-trop-
ic evaluations of the state of the economy. However, they 
also argue that Uribe’s governing style and communica-
tion strategy contributed enormously to Uribe’s sustained 
approval rates. Uribe, they argue, used the security threat 
from guerillas to create a “permanent rally-around-the flag 
effect” and devised a communication strategy that helped 
him sustain this effect throughout his term. This focus on 
governing style echoes that of other research published in 
the Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública on Colom-
bia (Bonilla, Rincón and Uribe, 2014) and Argentina (Costa 
and Klobovs, 2011). 
Lastly, Adrián Pignataro and María José Cascante pro-
vide an in-depth look at what makes Costa Rican president, 
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Oscar Arias, an outlier –two times over. Spiking approval 
levels in his first term owe to a rally-”round-the-flag” ef-
fect of winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for his work 
on the Esquipulas II Peace Accords that helped to end hos-
tilities in Central America and to usher in a period of peace 
and democracy throughout the region. Additionally, Pigna-
taro and Cascante identify high rates of social spending as 
a contributing factor to his ability to rebound well ahead 
of elections in both terms. Increasing fragmentation and, in 
turn, lower vote shared account for the lack of honeymoon 
in Arias’s second term.
In her article on Uruguay, Lucía Selios retakes the con-
cept of clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten, 1992), 
and argues that the effect of economic performance on ap-
proval changed with the constitutional reform of 1997. In-
terestingly, Selios finds that executive approval before the 
reform did not match the “typical” pattern but a clear cycle 
characterized approval after the constitutional changes. Her 
work suggests that this change is rooted in the institutional 
changes which decreased the number of veto players, and 
consolidated electoral competition among two ideologi-
cal blocks. As such, Selios’s piece speaks to work published 
in this journal (Ratto, 2015) and elsewhere (Johnson and 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallar-
do, 2015b) on the role clarity of responsibility plays in in-
cumbent support in Latin America.
These articles contribute to a growing literature on the 
dynamics of approval in presidential systems (e.g., Arce 
and Carrión, 2010; Carlin, Carreras and Love, forthcoming; 
Cuzán and Bundrick, 1997; Carlin, Hartlyn and Martínez-
Gallardo, 2012; Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Pérez-
Liñán, 2007) by highlighting a set of factors that explain 
why some presidents deviate from the typical cyclical pat-
tern. In line with previous research on economic voting in 
Latin America (e.g., Boelhouwer Menezes, 2018; Benton, 
2005; Cabezas, 2015; Cabezas and Navia, 2010; Echegaray, 
2005; Gélineau, 2007; Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; 
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Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013; Love and Windsor, 2018; Lu-
na, 2002; Menezes, 2018; Murillo and Visconti, 2017; Sing-
er, 2013, 2015; Singer and Carlin, 2013; Visconti, 2017), all 
of the authors in this special issue agree that economic out-
puts –and economic perceptions of performance– go a long 
way in explaining patterns of executive approval. Also in 
line with previous work (Powell and Whitten, 1993), some 
of the articles find that institutions can alter patterns of ap-
proval. In Uruguay, for example, Selios finds that following 
a 1997 reform which decreased the number of veto players 
presidential popularity more closely conformed to the “typi-
cal” cycle than before the reform. In Costa Rica, institutional 
changes worked in the opposite direction; although formal 
rules remained unchanged in the period under study, frag-
mentation and the number of parties increased substantial-
ly, making it harder for presidents to win a strong mandate 
and putting downward pressure on approval. 
However, by disaggregating the data to look at individ-
ual cases, the authors in this special issue also uncover ef-
fects that have been obscured in cross-national research 
and case-study investigations of the United States. For ex-
ample, existing work on aggregate approval tends to ig-
nore explanations based on the individual characteristics or 
decisions of particular presidents (e.g., Campello and Zuc-
co, 2016). But a clear hypothesis generated from the case 
studies presented here is that individual presidents are not 
passive observers of the ups and downs of their approv-
al. Instead, presidents cultivate their image, craft a commu-
nication strategy that highlights their policy achievements 
(or minimizes their mishaps), and time their actions in ways 
that are calculated to improve their popular standing. Vari-
ations in patterns of approval are rooted, in most cases, in 
presidents’ ability to do this effectively. 
The case of Colombian president Álvaro Uribe is a good 
example of a successful case. Uribe did not stake his pop-
ularity on calming inflation alone –he made a strategic 
choice to focus his communication strategy on the security 
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threat posed by the guerrilla because he calculated that it 
would benefit him politically. As a result, he enjoyed high 
rates of approval throughout his term. In Costa Rica, presi-
dent Arias had mixed success; although he benefited from 
a reputational boost when he received the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1987, he was unable to leverage his signature 
policy achievement in his second term, CAFTA, into high-
er approval rates. As Pignataro and Cascante note, valence 
issues such as the Peace Prize are much more easily con-
verted to higher popularity than distributional issues like 
the trade deal.  
The articles in this special issue are obviously not the 
last word on understanding deviations from the typical dy-
namics of presidential approval –especially as new da-
ta become available. But the case studies in this issue give 
rise to a series of hypotheses that future research might 
test and, perhaps, mold into a broader theory of presiden-
tial approval. Such hypotheses highlight elements of gov-
erning style, political communication, war and peace, poli-
cy choice, and institutional change. Extant research touches 
on some of these factors without synthesizing them into 
a more general theory. Whether crafting such a theory is 
even possible remains an open question, of course, but we 
hope the classification of outliers described above and the 
hypotheses emanating from the case studies in this issue 
can spur mid-range theorizing that helps explain variations 
in the typical cycle of approval.
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Figure 3. Dynamics of presidential approval in Latin America by 
country and administration, 95% C.I.s
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Anexo
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics of Latin American Presidential 
Approval Series 
Country Start End Qtrs.
Input 
Series
%  
Variance 
Explained
Cases Mean
Std.
Dev.
Argentina 1983, Q4 2016,Q2 131 39 77.28 912 47.11 14.10
Bolivia 1998, Q3 2016,Q2 72 12 83.26 251 47.58 11.87
Brazil 1979, Q2 2016,Q2 149 13 95.21 929 48.20 15.33
Chile 1990, Q2 2016,Q2 105 25 83.18 696 48.96 11.35
Colombia 1994, Q1 2016,Q2 90 15 91.98 626 55.70 15.28
Costa Rica 1978, Q3 2016,Q2 152 13 78.80 364 40.28 12.76
Dom. Rep. 2000, Q4 2016,Q1 62 7 95.28 120 54.42 18.30
Ecuador 1979, Q3 2016,Q2 148 16 83.64 1451 52.82 14.38
El Salva-
dor
1986, Q2 2016,Q1 120 15 78.65 287 54.54 13.52
Guatemala 1987, Q4 2016,Q1 114 13 58.78 185 48.08 12.80
Honduras 1986, Q2 2016,Q2 121 7 75.73 140 43.85 12.09
Mexico 1989, Q1 2016,Q2 100 32 63.71 2264 57.56 7.79
Nicaragua 1989, Q4 2016,Q2 107 12 79.19 165 43.30 14.35
Panama 1990, Q3 2016,Q2 104 9 83.00 302 47.64 12.15
Paraguay 1996, Q4 2015,Q3 76 15 74.42 136 36.05 13.64
Peru 1981, Q1 2016,Q2 142 19 92.97 1016 30.85 14.46
Uruguay 1986, Q3 2016,Q2 120 12 89.32 535 44.98 13.84
Venezuela 1987, Q1 2016,Q1 117 24 67.81 483 42.44 8.22
Source: Carlin et al., 2016, EAD 1.0.
